Job mobility is inherently risky as workers have limited ex ante information about many dimensions of outside jobs. Heterogeneity in risk preferences may therefore be an important determinant of turnover.
Introduction
Individuals face many risky decisions during their working life. Some of these decisions are riskier than others and some individuals are more risk averse than others (Diamond and Stiglitz, 1974) . This study focuses on the role of risk aversion in the decision to move from one job to another. The central premise is that moving is generally more risky than staying and that therefore risk averse workers are reluctant to quit their job and accept another one. Job mobility is risky as it potentially involves substantial changes relative to the status quo. On the one hand, the worker may improve his labour market position by searching for and accepting a new job: the empirical literature shows that job mobility is an important source of wage growth (Topel and Ward, 1992) . On the other hand, because the worker has limited information about many aspects of the new job (i.e. in the words of Nelson (1970) , jobs are experience goods), after accepting the offer he may realize that he ended up in a poor match. As some rungs may be slippery, climbing up the career ladder involves the risk of falling down.
The two main models in economics to analyze turnover are based on the notion of imperfect information and introduce uncertainty in the labour market. First, (on-the-job) search models assume that there is uncertainty about whether you will find a (better) job (Burdett, 1978; Mortensen, 1986) . In search models jobs are pure search goods, so there is no ex ante uncertainty about the quality of the new job -workers simply accept a new wage offer if it is higher than the current wage. In these models, search is a risky decision with certain costs and uncertain rewards. Second, matching models assume that jobs are experience goods: in the extreme case, the jobs are pure experience goods and the worker has no information about the quality of the job (Jovanovic, 1979) . Given this uncertainty, accepting a new job is inherently risky.
Since uncertainty plays a central role in the canonical models for the analysis of turnover, it is surprising that the role of risk aversion in turnover decisions has been ignored in the labour economics literature. 1 The theoretical models assume that individuals are risk neutral, and hence there is no heterogeneity in risk preferences. Given that mobility decisions are risky, we argue that interpersonal variation in risk aversion may provide an important explanation for differences in mobility patterns. Existing studies on the role of risk aversion in the labour market focus on pre-entry sorting effects (self-selection) of risk aversion through educational and occupational choice (Bonin et al., 2007) . Furthermore, several studies examined the relation between risk preferences and the exit rate out of unemployment (although empirical tests are scarce: see ...ref). More related to this study, Shaw (1996) examines the relation between risk aversion and income, and argues that risk aversion is inversely related to training (and thereby to wage growth).
However, she does not examine the underlying mechanism, but rather studies the relation between risk aversion and income growth (relying on noisy proxies for risk aversion). Here we analyze the relation between risk aversion and job mobility and thereby study a mechanism through which risk preferences affect wage growth.
The study derives several new theoretical predictions on the relation between risk preferences and job mobility. In addition to the main effect on mobility, the relation may be more pronounced under certain 1 The idea that job mobility is a risky decision is mentioned casually in several economic studies but never examined explicitly. For instance, Tom et al. (2007) state: "Many decisions, such as ... to accept a new job, involve the possibility of gaining or losing relative to the status quo. When faced with such decisions, most people are markedly risk averse.". Outside the field of economics, the study of Allen et al. (2007) discusses the role of risk attitudes and derives several propositions drawing (mainly) on the psychological literature. However, the study does not test these propositions empirically.
circumstances: if the worker holds a permanent contract, is in a good job match and when the labour market conditions are worse, turnover may be especially risky. We therefore expect a stronger relation between risk aversion and turnover under these conditions. We test these predictions empirically using the LISS, a recent longitudinal panel from the Netherlands. In addition to information on labour market behaviour and a wide range of background characteristics, the data contains measures of risk preferences.
Risk preferences are elicited through (incentivized) lab experiments that are taken to the field. This unique dataset thus provides an opportunity to analyze the relation between risk aversion and labour market behaviour, using data from the field (rather than from student subject pools).
The study provides new insights on the determinants of turnover. Turnover is a relevant economic issue, as it affects individuals' careers (and thereby their wage income) (Topel and Ward, 1992; Blau and DeVaro, 2007) , is related to firm productivity (Ilmakunnas* et al., 2005; Siebert and Zubanov, 2009) , the functioning of the labour market (allocative efficiency) (Jovanovic, 1979; Jackson, 2013; Mortensen, 2011) .
The paper demonstrates that heterogeneity in preferences are important, and that (policy) evaluations assuming risk neutrality or a single risk aversion parameter (representative agent models) may produce misleading results. Furthermore, the results may provide a new explanation for the observed income distribution. More specifically, the findings may explain a part of the gender wage gap (studies generally find that women tend to more risk averse than men, see Borghans et al. (2009) .
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical mechanisms through which risk aversion affects job mobility. Several hypotheses are presented. Next, the data is discussed (experiment in LISS) and the empirical results are presented. The final section concludes.
Theoretical framework
On-the-job search and job matching models -the benchmark theoretical models of turnover -are based on imperfect information. In the first type of models, workers search for other jobs and when an offer is located they accept it if the value of the alternative job is higher than the value of the current job. On-thejob search models assume that workers have perfect information about all aspects of the offered job and therefore there is no ex ante uncertainty about the value of a located job. In contrast, matching models are based on the presumption that workers have no (limited) ex ante information about the job. The new worker learns about the quality of the job match while on the job. As pointed out by Jovanovic (1979: p.973), the fundamental difference between these models is that in search models jobs are pure search goods and job mobility is due to the arrival of new information about alternative job opportunities, whereas in matching models jobs are pure experience goods and turnover is the result of obtaining new (negative) information about the current job. Here we present the models in a rather stylized form, but they illustrate how heterogeneity in risk aversion may explain variation in job mobility. Existing studies using search and matching models generally assume risk neutrality or homogeneity: this paper examines to what extent heterogeneity in risk aversion can explain job mobility and therefore derives theoretical predictions on the relation between risk aversion and job mobility.
As many uncertainties about a job involve the non-pecuniary characteristics, in the models we discuss the job is not simplified to a single wage (which is common in many labour economics models and in almost all search models), but the job match has a particular value in terms of utility. The value of the match contains all aspects of the job that generate (dis)utility for holding the job, such as income, working hours, commuting time and satisfaction. In the on-the-job search model workers choose the level of search effort s ∈ [0, 1] to maximize expected lifetime utility V:
where r represents the discount rate, V(y 0 ) (u(y 0 )) denotes the lifetime (instantaneous) value obtained from the current job match y 0 and c(s) presents the search costs, which are a monotonically increasing convex function of search effort s. Search costs may be monetary (for instance, related to traveling), but it is likely that the lion's share of the search costs have a non-pecuniary nature: looking for job openings, writing application letters and attending interviews are time and effort consuming activities. If the worker searches he receives expected benefits E{.}, which depend on the job offer arrival rate sλ, where λ ∈ [0, 1] is an exogenous job market parameter. Job offers (matches) are drawn from the cumulative distribution function F(y). Since the job seeker has perfect information about the job once he has received the offer, the worker accepts the offer if the quality of the alternative match is higher than the quality of the current match (y 1 > y 0 ). In contrast to not searching -which leads to no changes with respect to the status quo -the gains from search are uncertain. The payoffs for searching depends on whether or not the worker finds a better job.
Job search is successful with probability sλ[1 − F(y 0 )], leading to a payoff equal to V(
With probability 1 − sλ[1 − F(y 0 )], search is unsuccessful and leads to costs c(s). Job search is therefore a risky investment with certain costs and uncertain rewards. Optimal job search effort is determined by setting the marginal costs of search equal to the expected marginal benefits of search:
Which can be formulated as:
where p is the risk premium, which is positively associated with risk aversion. Because the gains of search are uncertain, risk aversion decreases the value of the marginal benefits of search. Ceteris paribus, risk aversion decreases the optimal marginal costs of search and therefore the level of on-the-job search intensity (given the convexity of c(s)). Consequently, the turnover probability, sλ[1 − F(y 0 )], declines with p. The assumption that the job seeker has perfect certainty about (all aspects of) the job is rather strict. Borjas and Goldberg (1978) already pointed out this limitation and stressed that it is unlikely that the individual has no uncertainty about all aspects of the job: "it is likely that uncertainty both before and after search about firms and workers and the on-the-job learning process which reduces this uncertainty is an important characteristic of the labor market" (Borjas and Goldberg, 1978) .
In job matching models risk aversion affects job mobility through the job acceptance rather than the job arrival decision. Assuming that jobs are pure experience goods, the worker has no prior information about alternative jobs. The model presented here follows the central premise of the model of Jovanovic (1979) : the individual has more information about the current job than outside job opportunities and new information arrives while on the job. To capture this idea of ex ante uncertainty about match quality, we assume that each period the worker receives an alternative offer and that the quality of the new job match is perceived with a noisy signalŷ 1 . For simplicity, we assume that the worker has perfect information about the current job match and that the real value of the job is immediately observed when the job is accepted. The value of the alternative job is given by:
where V(y) is the value of job with match quality y, where y is redrawn from the distribution F(y), which has an lower and upper bound y ∈ [y,ȳ]. The match may turn out to be better or worse than expected with probability ε. The worker accepts the offer in case it is higher than the reservation job quality y * , which is defined by:
Or alternatively:ŷ
Equation (6) shows that the worker's reservation match quality increases with the risk premium p and hence with risk aversion. Because the worker has limited ex ante information about the quality of a new job, job mobility is inherently risky.
Risk averse workers are less likely to quit and leave for another job, as they invest less in job search activities and have a higher reservation match quality level. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 More risk averse workers have lower turnover rates
Search and matching models lead to the same predictions about the relation between risk aversion and turnover. According to search models, risk aversion affects turnover through the search effort decision.
However, if search costs are quantitatively small, the potential losses associated with unsuccessful search are limited. The riskiness of the search decision may therefore be limited. In contrast, the decision to quit and accept an outside offer may lead to substantial losses if the new job turns out to be a bad match. We expect therefore that risk aversion mainly affects job mobility through the job acceptance decision. We will test empirically whether risk aversion affects job search behavior.
In addition to the main effect of risk aversion, we can derive several testable predictions about the size of the effect. The risks related to a job change depend on the individual's current position (Hypothesis 2a-b) and on the opportunities to mitigate the loss due to accepting a bad job (Hypothesis 2c). First, the potential loss associated with turnover depends on the quality of the current match:
where V(y H ) ≥ V(y 0 ) and V(y L ) < V(y 0 ): the redrawn match quality may be higher (y H )or lower (y L ) than the previous match y 0 . When the worker is close to the lower bound of the match quality distribution, separating involves few risks (F(y 0 ) is close to zero). Even if the job match turns out worse than expected, the worker is likely to improve his position by accepting another position. However, when the current job match quality is near the upper bound of the match quality distribution (F(y 0 ) approaches 1), moving to a seemingly better job involves the risk of ending up in a poor match ex post. The probability that turnover leads to a loss increases with the value of y 0 . Basically, leaving a good job is more risky than leaving a bad job.
Hypothesis 2a The size of the negative effect of risk aversion on job mobility increases with the quality of the current job match Another testable prediction arises because some jobs may be more flexible than others, i.e. some jobs have higher lay-off rates. If we introduce (match-specific) layoff rates q, staying also involves some risks, as the value of the current match is given by:
where V(u) indicates the utility when the worker is fired and enters unemployment (we assume that
The value of the alternative match can be described as:
V(y) with probability ε V(u) with probability q 1
In general, we may expect that the current match offers more employment protection than the alternative match (q 0 < q 1 ), as firing costs increase with tenure and workers may have obtained a permanent contract. Permanent workers may sacrifice their employment protection if they move to another job, so quitting involves substantial risks. Hence, introducing lay-off rates does not change the prediction formulated in Hypothesis 1. In fact, when employment protection increases with seniority, q 0 < q 1 and the riskiness of moving relative to staying will increase. Concerning Hypothesis 2a, if the worker is in a good match, q 0 is likely to be low and accepting another job will imply a significantly higher lay-off risk: this is consistent with the theoretical prediction.
However, the assumption that staying is less risky than moving may not always hold. The probability that workers on a temporary contract are retained by their employer is relatively small (compared to permanent workers). Staying in a temporary job may involve more uncertainties than moving. For temporary workers, the relation between risk aversion and mobility is therefore ambiguous. In general, the relative riskiness of moving compared to staying decreases with the lay-off rate associated with the current job.
Hypothesis 2b
The relation between risk aversion and job mobility is larger for permanent workers than for temporary workers
The previous predictions (2a-b) relate to the current position of the worker: if the current match is poor or uncertain, the effect of risk aversion is weaker. It's not risky to leave a sinking ship. A third prediction is related to the worker's opportunity to mitigate a potential loss if the new match turns out to be poor.
When the worker accepted a 'lemon' (V(y l ) in equation 7), he may of course search for and accept another job. The time it will take to find another offer -and therefore the size of the loss -depends on the economic conditions. When the vacancy rate is high, alternative job offers are relatively easy to find: this implies that when a worker ends up in a bad job match, the worker can simply quit and move to another job. So, in a good economic climate, turnover is less risky because a potential negative outcome can be offset by accepting another job within a short period of time (implying V(y l ) is relatively high). Even risk averse individuals may not prefer one bird in the hand if there are plenty in the bush. In a tight labor market, job mobility is less risky and therefore the relation between risk aversion and mobility is weaker.
Hypothesis 2c
The size of the negative relation between risk aversion and job mobility decreases with the tightness of the labor market A final issue is related to human capital investments. As pointed out by Shaw (1996) , risk aversion may affect human capital decisions (and thereby income growth). She argues that more risk averse workers invest less in (firm-specific) human capital, because the returns of such investments are uncertain. In case we allow for turnover in the human capital model, these decisions become interdependent as the worker sacrifices his firm-specific human capital when he separates. An important question is how this may affect the theoretical predictions on turnover. On the one hand, following Shaw's argument, risk seeking workers invest more in firm-specific human capital and may therefore be reluctant to leave their current job. This suggests that the relation between risk aversion and turnover is positive rather than negative. On the other hand, following the search and matching models, risk averse workers are more likely to stay and therefore have stronger incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital: if they indeed do so, this mechanism reinforces the negative effect on job mobility as larger levels of firm-specific human capital increase incentives to stay. We therefore argue that the effect of risk aversion through human capital decision is ambiguous.
Data and methodology
To test the hypotheses empirically, we make use of the LISS ( We elicit risk preferences through an 'artefactual field experiment' (Harrison and List, 2004) , i.e. by taking lab experiments to the field. In 2009, 3457 LISS respondents (59.2 percent) participated in an experiment where they had to make 17 binary choices in lottery games. About 40 percent of the subjects (almost 1400) were incentivized through a lottery: one out of ten incentivized subjects was selected as a winner. In case the subjects were incentivized, it was stressed in the instructions that the subjects could actually earn money (see Appendix). Next, one of the 17 choices was randomly selected and the outcome of the game was paid to the subject. The potential payoffs were between 10 and 150 euros. 2 Here we focus on the five games that aim to capture risk aversion. In these games, the subjects had to choose between a certain and a risky option. In all games, the risky option consisted of a 50 percent gain of 5 and a 50 percent gain of 65 euro. The expected value of this option was therefore 35 euro. The certain payoff varied from 20 to 40 euro, which was presented in a stepwise manner (with steps of e 5) to the subjects on separate screens. 3 Notes In all five games, when the risky option is chosen the subject receives either e 5 or e 65 (both outcomes occur with a 50 percent chance) Table 1 presents the decisions of the subjects. Risk neutral agents opt for the risky option in Game 5, are indifferent between the certain and risky option in Game 4 (both have an expected value of e 35) and prefer the risky payoff in Game 1-3. Risk averse individuals opt for the certain payoff in Game 4 and 5 (and maybe in 1-3), whereas a risk seeking individual prefers the risky payoff in Game 1-4. The table (full sample) shows that in Game 1 about half of the sample and in Game 2 and 3 a majority chooses the certain payoff, while the payoffs were (considerably) lower than the expected value of the risky option (e 35). In
Game 4,
The expected value of the risky option is equal to the certain payoff in Game 4: a large majority prefers the certain payoff. The data therefore indicate that most individuals are risk averse. The selected male workers seem to be more risk seeking than average, opting more frequently for the risky outcome in Game 1-3. A reason could be that men are more risk seeking than women and/or that employed are more risk seeking than non-employed individuals. Furthermore, when the subjects are incentivized, they seem to make more risky decisions. Since the assignment to the experimental condition (real or hypothetical payoffs) is random, this suggest that incentives matter when eliciting risk preferences. An explanation for this finding is that individuals make their decisions more carefully when faced with real consequences.
We construct an aggregate measure of risk aversion by summing up the number of safe choices. 4 Figure   1 shows the distribution of this aggregated measure. Risk averse agents would prefer the safe outcome two times at most (Game 4 and 5). Again, these figures indicate that most individuals are risk averse. There are some differences between the distributions: the selected male workers are more risk seeking, as are subjects who faced real payoffs. However, the shapes of the distributions are similar: the ranking of the variable with respect to the frequency is the same in all distributions (except for the '0' outcome which is relatively popular in the incentivized male worker sample). For the empirical analysis, we use the standardized value of the number of safe choices to capture heterogeneity in risk aversion. We assume that there is no withinindividual variation in risk aversion over time, and therefore impute the risk aversion variable which was measured in 2009 in the other four years. This allows us to exploit the available information from the other waves as well. We measure job mobility using items on the year and month of hiring. Unfortunately, the LISS does not contain information on the exact date of the termination of the job, so duration of completed spells cannot be measured accurately. We therefore use the panel structure of the data and the year and month of hiring information to infer whether the worker moved from one job to another between wave t and t + 1. Around 6 percent of the workers is mobile between two consecutive waves. Furthermore, we have no information on the reason why the worker left the employer, so the variable captures both voluntary and involuntary job turnover (however, the data does contain information that we can use to test whether involuntary mobility drives the results, see section). We test Hypothesis 1 by estimating the effect of risk aversion on the probability to move from one employer to another with a random effects probit model:
where m indicates job mobility, R denotes the individual's risk aversion and X it is vector of individual characteristics that affect job mobility. We use a large number of control variables in the analysis, including individual characteristics (e.g. age, education, children, whether the worker is a homeowner or not 5 ), job characteristics (e.g. tenure, working hours, type of employment contract, occupation), firm characteristics (public sector, industry, firm size). To test Hypothesis 2a-c, we estimate but include an interaction term between risk aversion and the variable of interest:
where I it represents the variable that interacts with risk aversion. To test Hypothesis 2a, we exploit data on job satisfaction to measure the quality of the job match (several other studies have used job satisfaction as a proxy for job match quality, e.g. Clark (2001); Gielen and Tatsiramos (2012) ). Following Ferreira and Taylor (2011), we construct an aggregate job satisfaction variable using several questions on satisfaction with different aspects of the job. Match quality is captured by the first factor scores resulting from a factor analysis (estimated by maximum likelihood) on six job satisfaction items (see Appendix for details). Hypothesis 2b
is tested by including an interaction between the type of contract and risk aversion. Finally, we use data on industry-specific vacancy rates (second quarter of the year), obtained from CBS Statistics Netherlands, to examine the role of the labour market conditions in the relation between risk aversion and job mobility (Hypothesis 2c). Although all other estimations control for the wave, the year dummies are excluded in the model including the vacancy rate: the variable captures within industry variation in the vacancy rate.
Results

Main results
The main findings are presented in table 2 (marginal effects). The base estimations (model (1)) show that there is a negative and significant relation between risk aversion and the probability to move to another job. The size of the effect is larger in the sample that only includes workers who faced real incentives in the lottery experiment. The estimations results are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Concerning the role of the type of employment contract (model (2)),the findings indicate that the relation between risk aversion and job mobility is fully driven by workers on a permanent contract. Since for temporary workers staying may be as risky (or even riskier) than moving, risk aversion has no significant effect on job mobility. Again, the effect is stronger in the incentivized sample. These findings support Hypothesis 2a.
To test hypothesis 2b, we include job satisfaction as a measure of match quality and interact this variable with risk aversion. We estimate the model using a continuous job satisfaction variable and a dummy indicating good or poor matches (using the median job satisfaction score as a cut-off point). Figure 2 shows the marginal effects of risk aversion estimated at different levels of the job satisfaction distribution; table 2 (model (3)) presents the results using the match quality dummy. In line with the theoretical predictions, the marginal effect of risk aversion increases with the quality of the job match. The results using a match quality dummy show that the relation between risk aversion and mobility is significant for employees in good matches, but insignificant for mismatched workers. Moving to another job implies quitting the current one: this decision is not risky when the worker is in a poor match as it's unlikely that the new match will turn out to be worse than the current one.
Labour market conditions may affect the riskiness of the turnover decision, because they determine the worker's opportunities to mitigate unanticipated losses if the match turns out to be disappointing. The marginal effects plotted in Figure 2 point out that the effect of risk aversion decreases with the vacancy rate. The estimation results using a binary variable indicating a good economic climate (which is defined by the median vacancy rate; model (4)) show that the effect of risk aversion is completely concentrated in good economic times.
Interestingly, when variation in risk aversion is captured by alternative . In wave 2010, respondents are asked whether they are willing to take risks or trying to avoid risks (on a 10 point scale, where a higher score indicates a higher preference for risk). These questions are asked concerning risk taking in general, and for three specific domains (financial, occupation and leisure). To make the results comparable, we use standardized values of these questions. The findings using such alternative indicators of risk preferences generally confirm are central results: more risk averse workers are less mobile. Interestingly, the effect sizes are in fact quite similar. Whereas the individual's preference for risk taking in financial matters does not perform well as a predictor for mobility, the association between job mobility and risk aversion in occupational choice or leisure activities is relatively large.
Does job search intensity drive the results?
Theoretically, both the job search and the matching model predict that more risk seeking workers are more mobile between jobs. However, the underlying mechanisms are fundamentally different. On the one hand, in the on-the-job search model investing in job search is a risky activity as the individual has no ex ante information about job offers. Once an offer is located, there is no uncertainty about the value of the job. On the other hand, the matching model is based on the presumption that individuals have no or only limited ex ante information about the job -i.e. jobs are experience goods.
Unfortunately, the LISS data does not contain information about acceptance or rejection of job offers.
However, there is information available about job search activities of the respondents. In the previous literature, job search effort has been measured by the time spent on search activities (Krueger and Mueller, 2010) , the number of applications in the past month(s) (van der Klaauw and van Vuuren, 2010), the number of job search channels (Manning, 2009 ) and the job search attitude (Bloemen, 2005) . Here we use various indicators: whether the worker searches for a job, whether the worker applied for another job in the past two months, the number of applications in the past two months and the number of job search channels the worker has used in the past two months (see Appendix for descriptives of the search variables).
We estimate for each of the four dependent models four models: one without interaction terms and three with different interaction terms (type of contract, match quality, vacancy rate). We use the same set The results are presented in Table 3 . The first row shows the estimation results for the model without interaction terms. The marginal effect of risk aversion on search intensity is positive in all estimations and significant in two specifications (column (2) and (3)): risk averse workers are significantly more likely to apply for other jobs and apply more frequently. If we allow for interaction terms, the average marginal effect of risk aversion is positive in all and significant in some specifications. The positive effects are more pronounced if the worker is in a permanent contract or in a good match. The findings show that risk averse workers in permanent contracts use significantly more job search channels. Overall, the marginal effects are positive and in a number of specifications significant.
These empirical results are in contrast with the predictions derived from the search model. If job search is indeed a risky activity, it can be expected that more risk averse workers search more intensively. However, the results point out positive (and in some cases) significant relations. The evidence suggest that searching may not be perceived as a risky activity by workers -risk averse workers actually invest more in search activities. An explanation for the insignificant relations could be that the costs of search are certain and relatively small. Hence, the losses due to unsuccessful search may be small. In contrast, accepting a new job implies sacrificing the current (certain) position and moving to another (uncertain) position: the potential losses generated by this decision are both uncertain and substantial. Although this may explain why the relation between risk preferences and search is insignificant, it does not explain why risk averse workers search more on-the-job.
An alternative explanation could be that workers use on-the-job search as a strategy to decrease uncertainty about their future labour market position. Workers may search to obtain information about the jobs or the labour market in general, thereby decreasing the uncertainty involved with the mobility decision.
When jobs are a combination of search and experience goods, searching may reduce the ex ante uncertainty about a variety of job aspects. Basically, search may not only affect the job offer arrival rate, but may also decrease the risks related to turnover (i.e. searching decreases ε in equations 7 and 9. Given that risk averse workers do not search significantly less -but rather more -we argue that the negative relation between risk aversion and job mobility is fully driven by the negative effect on the job acceptance decision.
Conclusion and discussion
This paper examines the relation between risk aversion and job mobility. Workers have little ex ante information about outside job offers and therefore moving to quitting the current job and moving to a new one is risky. The decision is especially risky when the worker has a stable, protected position and when worker is satisfied with the current match. In those cases, the worker risks losing a valuable position while not knowing whether his new position will be an improvement. In addition, when the economic conditions are worse, the worker may have limited opportunities to mitigate unanticipated losses related to job mobility. These predictions are tested using evidence from the LISS panel, eliciting risk aversion through experiments with field subject. The results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Furthermore, the findings show that the effects are stronger in the sample that faces real monetary payments in the experiments rather than hypothetical payments: incentivizing subjects seems to matter.
As the findings show that heterogeneity in risk aversion explains differences in mobility patterns, they may explain differences in the income distribution as well: the empirical results provide a new explanation for existing income inequality. Hence, risk averse individuals may not only select in different occupations or types of education, once they enter the labour market they also follow different career paths. Because risk averse workers are more likely to stay at their current employer, they may climb the ladder using the internal labour market (i.e. through promotions). Wage growth of risk seeking workers is more likely due to external labour mobility.
The empirical results show that the relation between risk aversion and turnover is not driven by higher search intensity, indicating that the job acceptance decision is the central mechanism through which risk preferences affect mobility behaviour. Individuals may not only search on-the-job to receive a job offer, but may also use it as a strategy to decrease ex ante uncertainty about the quality of the job. Future research may examine this function of job search in more detail.
Appendix: Experiment
Research into decisional behavior Some people enjoy taking risks while others prefer to avoid them. In this research we ask you to each time make a choice between two options that can both win you prize money, depending on the throw of a sixsided die. There are no right or wrong choices in this study. The only thing that matters is your personal preference.
You can make money
You can actually win real money here! At the end of this research, the computer will determine at random whether you win any or not. The odds of winning are 1 in 10. If you win, the computer will select (again at random) one of the options that you chose. We then let the computer roll the dice. This is how we determine the amount won by your choice of option. That amount will subsequently be transferred into your bank account. Be sure, therefore, to always choose the option that you really prefer, because that may be the option that the computer selects to determine how much will be paid out to you.
Explanation part 1
In this part you need to choose between two options each time, either "Option L" (left) or "Option R" (right).
Here is an example:
A red die is thrown for every option. In the example above, "Option L" wins e 45 if a 1, 2 or 3 turns up. If the die turns up a 4, 5, or 6, "Option L" wins e 15. "Option R" always wins e 25, regardless of what the die turns up.
You can make money
Always choose the option that you truly prefer, since that may be the option selected by the computer if you are really to receive any prize money. 
Results: alternative risk aversion measures
